The November 1944 battles between the Luftwaffe and the US Air Force
The November 1944 battles between the Luftwaffe and the US Air Force is a chapter which has not been given the attention they would deserve in history writing. The big battles between the Luftwaffe and the 8th Air Force in the summer and autumn of 1943, and the most important days of the Battle of Britain are surpassed by the big days in November 1944 both in terms of numbers of aircraft involved, and the numbers of aircraft shot down.
In order to find other days with such vast aircraft losses in a single battle, we have to go to much more famous days like 10 May 1940 (and the massacre on Luftwaffe transport planes), 22 June 1941 (and the masses of shot down Soviet aircraft), or 19 August 1942 (with its disastrous RAF losses).
Through November 1944, fighters of US 8th and 9th Air forces were credited with a total of 492 aerial victories against only 80 own fighters recorded as lost in air combat - an average of more than six victories for each own loss, speaking for itself.
Clearly, the victories attained by the well-trained US fighter pilots in the great November 1944 battles were among the "easiest" victories achieved by any fighter pilots in World War II, quite comparable to the kills which were scored by the Luftwaffe veterans against Soviet rookies when Soviet pilot training had reached its lowest level in the summer of 1942.
In November 1944, the rebuilt German fighter arm gave a clear proof of the fact that sheer numbers but lacking quality against an enemy who enjoyed a superiority both regarding numbers and quality was bound to result in disaster.
The foundation for this was laid in the costly air battles over Germany in the first months of 1944, when a numerically inferior German fighter force was pulled into a very costly battle of attrition with US 8th and 9th Air forces.
In January 1944, the German day fighter force completed a total of 3,315 combat sorties in the Home Defence - against 12,541 effective combat sorties by US 8th and 9th Air forces. By May 1944, the monthly figures were 3,805 German day fighter combat sorties against 55,358 effective by US 8th and 9th Air forces (including 32,860 by US fighters). Thus, the German numerical inferiority rose steeply from one against almost four in January to one against over fourteen in May 1944. By the latter time, there were almost nine US fighters in the air for every German fighter over the Reich.
Out of an average German fighter pilot strength of 2283 for the period, no less than 2262 were lost in the period January through May 1944. German day fighter aircraft combat losses in the West, Home Defence and the south increased each month - 143 in January 1944, 524 in February, 583 in March, 687 in April and 758 in May. The grand total is 2425.
Indeed, the losses the German fighter pilots inflicted on their enemy still was higher than the own losses. The USAAF alone recorded 4,103 aircraft losses in Europe between January and May 1944, and 2223 of these were recorded as shot down by enemy aircraft. To these losses should be added those sustained by the RAF's Mediterranean forces, plus 421 of the British fighters which operated from the UK.
However, while the Allies could sustain such large losses and still maintain their high quality, the German losses inevitably and rapidly wore down the quality of the Luftwaffe.
As was noted in the article The effect of Allied numerical superiority in the air over Normandy in 1944, pilot training quality inevitably suffered. It started with the calling of many instructors to first-line service. This first step lowered the quality of the trainers themselves. Next, the pilot training schemes were shortened. Already in early 1944, the Luftwaffe fighter pilot training was shortened to an average of 160 flight hours. A few weeks later, it was further shortened to only 112 hours. Finally, in the spring of 1944, the B flight schools were disbanded, and the pilots were sent into first-line service directly after A schools. The condition for the A2 flight certificate included a basic training of sixty training flights with a total of 15 flight hours. Meanwhile, the average USAAF or RAF fighter pilot's training consisted of 225 flight hours.
Following bitter losses over Normandy in June - August 1944, the Luftwaffe's I. Jagdkorps was reduced to merely 339 serviceable fighters in September 1944.
However, German armament industry was increasing its production. Through September 1944, no less than 3375 new fighter planes were delivered from the industry. The battered fighter units were replenished with large numbers of new fighters. By 1 November 1944, the fighter force in Germany had increased to 1964 fighter planes, of which around 1500 were serviceable. The scene was set for a revival of the massive fighter attacks against the heavily escorted US heavy bomber formations which by that time dominated the skies over Germany.
But there was one decisive negative factor. The hastily trained rookies which were sent from the flight schools barely knew how to fly the aircraft, not to mention how little they knew of combat tactics. The negative effect of the shortened pilot training schemes was further aggravated through a desperate lack of fuel. The bombings of German oil targets resulted in a rapid decline in the amount of fuel stock. The amount of fuel which was assigned to the flight training schools plummeted from 50,000 tons in April 1944 to 15,000 tons in August and merely 7,000 tons in October 1944.
Many of the German fighter pilots who were sent up against the US formations in November 1944 had only three to five flight hours on a Bf 109 or an Fw 190. (Prien, "IV./JG 3", p. 250.)
The first among these Big Battles took place on 2 November 1944.
Go to next page: 2 November 1944: Sturmjäger Slip Through